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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Robert A. McFadden and RAMACFoothills, LLC,

Appellate Case No. 20050717

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Cache County Corporation and John
Does and Jane Does 1-10,
Defendants and Appellees.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
The first issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in its determination that
Appellants ("McFadden") had a duty to exhaust administrative remedies by filing an
appeal to the Cache County Board of Adjustments ("the Board") from the Cache County
Council's ("the Council") denial of McFadden's subdivision application. The standard of
appellate review on this issue is correctness. Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT
7, ff 8-9, 67 P.3d 446. This issue was preserved in the trial court in McFadden's
memorandum opposing motion for summary judgment. R. 37-42.

The second issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in determining that
there was no genuine issue as to any material fact regarding McFadden's claim that
exceptional circumstances excused McFadden from prosecuting an appeal to the Cache
County Board of Adjustments. The standard of appellate review on this issue is
correctness. Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 2001
UT 108, f 11, 44 P.3d 642. This issue was preserved in the trial court in McFadden's
supplemental memorandum opposing motion for summary judgment. R. 88-93.

STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAW
(1) The board of adjustments shall hear and decide:
(a) appeals from administrative decisions applying a zoning or subdivision
ordinance, including appeals from:
(i) building permit denials based upon a failure to comply with a zoning or
subdivision ordinance; and
(ii) administrative decisions related to subdivision plats;
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-703(l)(a) (2003).

Powers and Duties: The BOA [Cache County Board of Adjustment] shall have the
powers and duties set forth in Section 17-27-703.
Cache County Ordinance 2004-10, Section 17.02.020(B).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action was filed January 12, 2005 in the First Judicial District Court of
Cache County, Utah by McFadden against Cache County Corporation ("the County") for
claims arising out of the Council's denial of McFadden's application for a subdivision.
R. 2, 10-14. The County moved for summary judgment claiming McFadden failed to
2

exhaust administrative remedies before commencing the action in court. R. 20-21. The
trial court granted the motion and entered a final Order and Judgment.1 R. 176-78.
McFadden's application to the Council for approval of a subdivision plat was
considered on December 7, 2004, and was denied. R. 24, 33-34.2 McFadden submitted
two affidavits regarding post-December 7, 2004 interactions with the County's
Countywide Planner, Mr. Teuscher, regarding an appeal to the Board. R. 96-102. This
action was filed without McFadden having first perfected an appeal to the Board. R. 24.
McFadden claims to have invested hundreds of thousands of dollars in the development.
R. 16.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
McFadden had already exhausted his administrative remedies when the Council
made its decision because the Board had no authority to hear an appeal from this type of
decision. The Board was only authorized to hear appeals from "administrative"
decisions. The Council's decision, laced with policy considerations, was not
"administrative" in nature. At best the term "administrative" is ambiguous and the
ambiguity should be resolved in McFadden's favor.

1

The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, sitting for Judge Clinton S. Judkins, signed the Order
and Judgment. R. 178.
2
By subsequent stipulation the effective final date of the decision was December 14,
2004. R. 38,51-52.
3

Alternatively, McFadden should be excused from perfecting an appeal to the
Board because his attempts to do so were thwarted by the County. McFadden's proof of
exceptional circumstances should not have been rejected outright by the trial court.

ARGUMENT

I. THE BOARD LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL
The trial court determined that McFadden had not exhausted administrative
remedies by appealing to the Board. This conclusion was premised on the trial court's
view that the Board had been vested with authority to hear such an appeal. The trial court
was wrong. Its ruling that McFadden did not exhaust administrative remedies is not
entitled to any deference on review. Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, ff 8-9,
67P.3d446.
The ordinance defining the authority of the Board at the time of the subdivision
denial was Ordinance 2004-10, Section 17.02.020(B) which states:
Powers and Duties: The BOA [Cache County Board of Adjustment] shall have the
powers and duties set forth in Section 17-27-703.
At the time of the Council's decision, Section 17-27-703, Utah Code, provided in
pertinent part:
(1) The board of adjustments shall hear and decide:
(a) appeals from administrative decisions applying a zoning or subdivision
ordinance, including appeals from:
(i) building permit denials based upon a failure to comply with a zoning or
subdivision ordinance; and
3

It is obvious from other nearby references that this one is to the Utah Code. R. 56.
4

(ii) administrative decisions related to subdivision plats;
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-703(l)(a) (2003) (emphasis added).
The narrow question is whether the Council's decision denying McFadden a
subdivision was "administrative." This question turns on statutory construction.
In interpreting the meaning of a statute or ordinance, we begin first by
looking to the plan language of the ordinance. Biddle v. Wash, Terrace City, 1999
UT 110, f 14, 993 P.2d 875. When examining the plain language, we must
assume that each term was used advisedly. Id.
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, \ 30, 104 P.2d 1208.
The term "administrative decisions" is susceptible of more than one meaning in
this context, and is therefore ambiguous. This is illustrated by the changes made in 2001
to the statute. Prior to 2001 the statute provided:
(1) The board of adjustment shall hear and decide:
(a) appeals from zoning decisions applying the zoning ordinance!".]
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-703(l)(a) (1995). The qualifier "administrative" was absent.
The term "administrative," if used advisedly, could not have been meant as a distinction
from "legislative" because boards of adjustment have never had authority to hear appeals
from legislative decisions. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah
1992) (board of adjustment "lacked legitimate authority to review the rezoning"). The
2001 version of the statute excludes legislative decisions from the jurisdiction of boards
of appeals by use of the phrase "applying a zoning or subdivision ordinance." The
qualifier "applying" was used in the prior statute, which did not contain the
"administrative" qualifier. So "administrative decisions" must mean something other
5

than "non-legislative decisions." Otherwise, the word "administrative/' employed twice
in the statute, becomes useless.
This court also interprets statutes to give meaning to all parts, and avoids
rendering portions of the statute superfluous. Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr.,
2004 UT 11, f 16,89 P.3d 113.
LKL Associates, Inc. v. Farley, 2004 UT 51, f 7, 94 P.3d 279. There is no specific
definition of "administrative" within the pre-2005 version of the County Land Use
Development and Management Act ("CLUDMA"). It cannot, therefore, be discerned
from the plain language of the statute which decisions are "administrative" and which
decisions are not "administrative."
Statutory construction of ambiguous terms is subject to review for correctness.
John Holmes Construction, Inc. v. RA. McKell Excavating, Inc., 2005 UT 83, f 6.
Because this issue arises in the context of a summary judgment, we "View the
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party.f"
Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, this statute, as part of the zoning regime, is "in
derogation of a property owner's use of land" and should be "construed in favor of
allowing the use." Carrier at f 31. The purview of the authority of a county's board of
adjustment under this prior statute was characterized as "very limited" by this Court in
BAM. Development, LLC v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT App 34 % 20, 87 P.2d 710, rev yd
2005 UT 89 (12/13/2005)(reversed on other grounds). With these principles in mind, the
Council's rejection of McFadden's subdivision is not an "administrative" decision subject
to appeal to the Board. The denial of the subdivision request was wholesale. In the
6

eight-page resolution appending the minutes, the Council made eight "findings" with
several sub-"fmdings." R. 43-50. The County's stated justifications were anything but
"administrative" in nature; the rejection left no room to believe that the application could
be tweaked to suit the Council.4 If there were a spectrum of non-legislative subdivision
decisions, the Council's denial of McFadden's subdivision would appear on the extreme
"non-administrative" end. On the extreme other end might appear an issue such as the
quality of the vellum on which a plat is printed.
The Council's decision was not an "administrative" one over which the Board had
authority to hear an appeal. The trial court erred in determining that McFadden was
under an obligation to prosecute such an appeal before remedies were exhausted.

II. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXCUSE EXHAUSTION
The trial court ruled "as a matter of law" that there were no circumstances present
under which McFadden might be excused from exhausting administrative remedies.
Based on this ruling, the trial court entered summary judgment against McFadden. The
applicable standard of review on this issue is correctness. The trial court was wrong.
There were genuine issues as to contested facts precluding judgment for the County.

4

Some of the "Findings" were: "This is an urban subdivision that appropriately belongs
within the urban communities of Cache Valley." R. 45. "The policies and advisory
statements of the Countywide Comprehensive Plan warrant denial of this preliminary
plat;" R. 45. "The Council specifically finds that approval of this subdivision would
contravene long standing county policy as to Planning District #6." R. 47. "The Council
reconfirms pursuant to its stated policies as expressed in its Comprehensive Plan and
Land Use Ordinances, that it will endeavor and intends to protect 'prime agricultural
land' from such urban development." R. 47-48.
7

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. All of the facts, and all reasonable inferences
from those facts, are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, in this
case McFadden. John Holmes Construction at | 6.
The necessity of exhausting administrative remedies is a rule, but not without
exceptions under the law.
As a general rule, "parties must exhaust applicable administrative remedies
as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review." State Tax Comm 'n v. Iverson, 782
P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989). "Exceptions to this rule exist in unusual
circumstances where it appears that there is a likelihood that some oppression or
injustice is occurring such that it would be unconscionable not to review the
alleged grievance or where it appears that exhaustion would serve no useful
purpose." Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Johnson v. Utah State Ret. Office, 621
P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980) ("Exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be
necessary when it would serve no useful purpose.").
Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 34 P.3d 180, f 14 (Utah 2001). In Utah Bankers
Assoc, v. America First Credit Union, 912 P.2d 988 (Utah 1996), the rule of exhaustion
and the possibility of exceptions were acknowledged.
"[Administrative remedies, except in rare instances, must first be
exhausted before resort may be had to judicial review." State v. Higgs, 656 P.2d
998, 1001 (Utah 1982); see alsoS&Gf Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087
(Utah 1990).
Id., at 993 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court went on to distinguish the two
cases cited because the plaintiffs there "neglected to participate in agency proceedings . .
." Id. In the specific context of land use appeals, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated
that strict application of the exhaustion requirement could be excused if a "compelling
reason" were offered. Patterson v. American Fork City, 67 P.3d 446, 2003 UT 7, ^f 17.
In Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning Comm yn, 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah
8

1963), the plaintiff was held not to have exhausted his administrative remedies because
"an aggrieved person must use established procedures" and "the plaintiff should have
followed the established procedures . . ." but failed to do so. Id. (emphasis added).
McFadden established the following by his own affidavit:
2. Within a few days after December 7, 2005[sic], I went to the Cache
County Administration building at 179 North Main, Logan, Utah, and to the office
dealing with zoning.
3. I asked the lady behind the desk, (either Peggy or Marsha) for the forms
to complete in order to appeal the decision of the County Council denying my
subdivision application. I asked specifically for the forms to fill out for an appeal.
She handed me a multiple-page form, and there at the counter I began filling it out.
4. While in the process of filling it out, the lady helping me momentarily
left and returned shortly later with Mark Teuscher (the Cache County Countywide Planner).
5. Mr. Teuscher told me that I shouldn't be filling out the appeal form, or
words to the effect that the appeal was not the right procedure. I expressed my
frustration at not being able to appeal as I thought I was supposed to. I
immediately made a cell phone call and in Mr. Teuscher's presence and hearing
said that I was at the County offices, trying to fill out the appeal form and being
told by Mark Teuscher that I should not be doing so. Mr. Teuscher did not correct
me.
6. I would definitely have finished filling out the form and filed the appeal
and paid whatever the fee was, had Mark Teuscher not told me what he did.
R. 97. In addition, McFadden's attorney provided testimony regarding an exchange
between him (Brian G. Cannell) and Mr. Teuscher also after December 7, 2004.
I also asked whether there was any additional intervening appeal process prior to
district court review and asked specifically about the Board of Adjustments. I was
informed by Mr. Teuscher that the Board of Adjustments does not review
subdivision applications under the terms of the zoning ordinance and that process
did not apply to the Plaintiffs application.
9

R. 101. The County saw fit to submit an affidavit of Mr. Teuscher contradicting
McFadden's affidavit. For purposes of the County's motion for summary judgment,
however, the trial court was bound not only to accept the testimony of McFadden and his
attorney as established fact, but to also view all inferences which might be drawn from
the testimony in a light most favorable to McFadden. See John Holmes Construction at \
6. Though Teuscher disputes the dates and contexts in which the exchanges took place, it
is reasonable to infer from his testimony that in his exchange with McFadden he was
emphatic, telling McFadden what McFadden "had to" do, R. 155, and that in his
exchange with Mr. Cannell he would have confirmed "that the Board of Adjustment does
not review" subdivision decisions. R. 156.
These circumstances are of a type pursuant to which a Court, following trial, could
deem exceptional under the law. Under these facts the Court could determine that
McFadden did indeed exhaust his administrative remedies by prosecuting an appeal to the
Board of Adjustments until being interrupted by the County. McFadden did not ask Mr.
Teuscher's advice when he went to file the appeal - Mr. Teuscher emerged from his
office and intervened to detour McFadden. In light of the County's refusal to process an
appeal, what will the County now say Plaintiffs should have done other than go straight
from the County Council to District Court? This situation meets the legal test for an
exception. It is an "unusual circumstance" or a "rare instance" in that Defendant steered
Plaintiffs away from the very procedure Defendant now claims Plaintiffs should have
followed. "It appears that there is a likelihood that some oppression or injustice is
10

occurring such that it would be unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance"
because the failure-to-exhaust defense at this point operates (regardless of intent) as the
springing of a procedural trap. McFadden should not be held responsible for the lack of
an administrative appeal because he had not "neglected to participate in [available]
agency proceedings." To the contrary, he followed every "established procedure" in the
County, and went to court only after the County specifically told McFadden there was no
other recourse left.

CONCLUSION
There was no administrative remedy to the Board. Regardless of the Board's
authority, the County should not be allowed, in this case, to benefit from the exhaustion
requirement. McFadden asks this Court to reverse the trial court's order and judgment
and to remand for proceedings on the merits of the case.

STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM
No addendum is necessary under Rule 24(a)(l 1), Utah Rules of Appelktte
Procedure.
DATED December 27, 2005.
CHRIS DAINES LAW

Chris Daines
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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